A recent comparative analysis of the content of lobby regulation schemes published in this journal casts measures developed at EU level as the vanguard of a 'new wave' of strong lobby regulation across Europe. Other assessments characterise EU lobby regulation as weak, primarily based on the voluntary nature of a succession of registers of lobbyists, as well as the quality of data within them. We examine these competing perspectives through a focus upon the EU Transparency Register (TR), now exceeding 5,500 individual entries. We set the scheme within a 'transparency for legitimacy' pathway, and note its differentiation from predecessor instruments by its breadth of scope.
The Transparency Register: a European vanguard of strong lobby regulation? Executive Summary
A recent comparative analysis of the content of lobby regulation schemes published in this journal casts measures developed at EU level as the vanguard of a 'new wave' of strong lobby regulation across Europe. Other assessments characterise EU lobby regulation as weak, primarily based on the voluntary nature of a succession of registers of lobbyists, as well as the quality of data within them. We examine these competing perspectives through a focus upon the EU Transparency Register (TR), now exceeding 5,500 individual entries. We set the scheme within a 'transparency for legitimacy' pathway, and note its differentiation from predecessor instruments by its breadth of scope.
We assess the extent of coverage of its core targets through a comparison of the entries in two of its categories (business related, and NGOs) with other information sources; we estimate its coverage of intended population to be approximately three-quarters of business related organisations and around 60% of NGOs. These are sizeable proportions for a voluntary (albeit incentivised) register, but not sufficient yet to justify the 'de-facto mandatory' claim for it made at its launch in 2011. We then assess the structure of the register, the incentives to join it, and its population in detail. The quality of the data in the Transparency Register has progressively improved from the starting point of its predecessor schemes. Nonetheless, there are one-third of all entries in the register which did not choose 'European' as one of the interests they represent, but instead another territorial level. Whilst some data quality problems remain, with a fringe of questionable entries, the reliance upon those in the register to monitor it has driven up standards of data entry among the main lobbying players. Nonetheless, there are faults of design and nomenclature. A key juncture during the registration process involves a choice of category to appear in the register, affecting the disclosure and presentation of public information. We identify 15% of entries in the NGO category which could better be re-assigned to other categories. We identify the boundary points from which the data can be put to research use, involving the identification of a 'European interest' represented and use of a Brussels address, which makes the data less prone to outliers. Nonetheless even after this operation there remain problems in aggregating data on some indicators (particularly head-counts of lobbyists) because of the extent of the extreme cases.
However, some clear pictures emerge from the data; after removing duplicated entries from the Register, and discounting a small number of inappropriate outliers, we present the first such results from it. A key finding is that the differences in reported resources are less than might be expected between business related organisations and NGOs. One area where there is substantial difference concerns the receipt of EU funding for civil society organisations. The EU political system has long had substantial funding regimes in place for NGOs. We are able to provide the most accurate information yet available about the extent of NGO reliance upon EU political institutions. NGOs with a Brussels base representing a European interest and which receive a grant from EU institutions draw an average of 43% of their budget from such sources. 
Introduction
A recent comparative analysis of the content of lobby regulation schemes published in this journal casts measures developed at EU level as the vanguard of a 'new wave' of strong lobby regulation across Europe (Holman and Luneburg, 2012, p.91) . Other assessments have characterised EU lobby regulation as weak, primarily based upon the voluntary status of successive registers of lobbyists, as well as the quality of data within them (Chari, Hogan & Murphy, 2011; ALTER-EU, 2012a , 2012b . We examine these alternative perspectives through a focus upon the EU Transparency Register (TR), commencing with an examination of its features and ways in which the detail of the registration process might affect the disclosure and presentation of public information. We continue by contextualising it within path dependencies, and examine the extent of differentiation from predecessor instruments. We then assess the extent of coverage of its core targets through a comparison of the entries in two of its categories (business related, and NGOs) with other information sources. We follow this with an assessment of the potential and limitations provided by a substantial public database of 5,513 entries in the Register at the start of 2013.
We identify the boundary points from which the data can be put to public use, and after removing duplicated entries from the Register, we present the first such data drawn from it. Finally, we place the TR within traditions of comparative lobby regulation. Our analysis comes ahead of a scheduled review of the scheme by the European Commission and European Parliament, originally due by mid 2013 1 . We do so at a time when most EU member states have established regulatory instruments or currently have them under active consideration (Chari, Hogan & Murphy, 2011; Holman and Luneburg, 2012; JTRS, 2012a) .
EU lobbying and the emergence of the registers
Whilst most developed political systems have substantial interactions with stakeholders for a variety of purposes (Halpin and Jordan, 2012) , the EU is remarkable in a high degree of dependence upon organised interests to achieve its goals. This systemic dependence can be traced back to the lack of popular engagement with the EU, the need for consensus from decision making involving (soon to be) 28 member states, the relative degree of isolation of the European
Commission from other potential constituencies of support, and a chronic lack of resources in EU institutions relative to the substantive functions performed. In a quest for a variety of different types of legitimacies, an infrastructure has arisen to formalise exchanges with 'interested parties' 2 using devices commonly found elsewhere, centred on pluralist mechanisms of checks and balances and principles of transparency. Organised interests are also expected to play a systemic role of an 'unofficial opposition' in an otherwise consensually bound system, supported by a funding regime for (primarily) NGOs which often accounts for a high proportion of their income. Various interpretations place the role of organised interests in the EU system somewhere between participatory governance and attempts to stimulate a European public sphere (Heidbreder, 2012) . A lobby regulation scheme lies embedded within such a context. The main concern of Commissioner Kallas had been to establish the ROIR in the first instance, rather than to be overly concerned with points of operational detail with it. Once the ROIR was launched, Kallas was driven by achieving a 'headline figure' for the number of registrations, orientated towards a target of '2,600 interest groups with a permanent office in the capital of Europe' he had prominently mentioned in his ETI launch speech to justify the need for regulation (Kallas, 2005, p.5) . His team declined to provide guidance as to how to compile disclosure information about lobbying spending and head counts, other than advising organisations to make a 'good faith estimate' (Hood, 2009 ).
Organisations were able to skip questions on these factors entirely during the Register came into force (Chari, Hogan and Murphy 2011) . These authors had assigned schemes to their lowest regulated category which did not recognise executive branch lobbyists, nor involve the filing of spending reports, where there was no 'cooling-off' period on leaving political institutions, and where there was little by way of enforcement mechanisms (Chari, Hogan and Murphy, 2011) .
Whilst these failings applied to the EP AL scheme, the ROIR had elements of each of these regulatory features (or separately, in the case of requirements placed upon Commissioners when leaving office) 7 . The ROIR also involved disclosure of spending in categories, and income.
The reputational based enforcement mechanisms (suspension or exclusion from the register) of the TR continue a tradition from the ROIR. They are particularly significant for commercial affairs consultancies; in 2009 GPlus felt the effect on its client base after being suspended from the ROIR for four weeks after including in its data return an explanatory note that three clients had not been identified at their request (EurActiv, 2009 The expansion of operational guidelines from the ROIR to TR to identify a list of activities and structures covered by, and exempt from, the register seems to have had the effect of capturing the majority of its intended targets. However, without active administrative intervention there is nothing to deter registrations motivated solely by an opportunity for free publicity. Around two-thirds of entries on the register (34.9%; n=1917) do not identify 'European' among the territorial levels of interests they represent. A number of bizarre, and often amusing, examples can be found in the register, with little or no apparent connection to EU lobbying. Whilst their presence seems to some to discredit the register, they are 'distracting noise' when set against the progress made with improving the quality of entries for the main players active on the Brussels scene. NGOs demanding transparency from others have understood the need to set an example, with ALTER-EU circulating a methodological template amongst its 200+ members and beyond. Some companies have used this methodology to calculate their own data entries, while others follow guidelines from SEAP and the European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA). The result has been a gradual drift upwards in data quality since the start of the TR, with the most complete entries from those campaigning for higher standards, and from those in their line of fire.
Using the Transparency Register data: a case study
Whilst the Transparency Register database is freely downloadable, converting it into a usable format remains a task beyond most lay IT users. Having undertaken this with help from specialists, we then sought to see how useable the data might be by working with it at a level of detail.
Our first task was to remove duplicated entries (18 11 ). We then re-assigned the 240 mis-placed entries in the NGO category to other categories; whilst this produces a more accurate picture of the categories, it carries the consequence of including among producer categories a relatively small number of entries which had provided information to a slightly different structure of questions, and in particular optional (though mostly provided) reporting of spending data. Table 1 details the newly established population of the Transparency Register by category and sub-category: We assessed the extent to which the data in the register would allow us to establish whether it is populated mainly by organisations primarily orientated to engaging the EU. We found it could not do so with any precision, although using combinations of responses from 2-3 questions does allow a core of such organisations to be identified. When registering, organisations have the option to select up to four territorial levels of interest they represent: sub-national, national, European, and global. Almost two-thirds of all entries (65.1%; n=3577) identified that the interests they represent were European, raising some doubt as to the relevance of other entries. There was relatively minor variation between categories I-V, ranging from three-quarters of professional consultancies (74.5% -306) to 56.5% (437) The number of organisations on the Register which had at least one person with access accreditation to the European Parliament (1179) was lower than might be expected, accounting for just over one-fifth of all TR registrations. The growth in this population of the Register follows a long period of stagnation after a high profile 'Cash for Amendments' scandal in the EP in the spring of 2011, described in more detail in the next section. Whilst we were looking to evaluate the extent to which the EP access pass is an incentive to join the TR, the current population growth rate makes it too early to draw any firm conclusions about this. 81%
(953) of organisations with at least one person with EP access accreditation have an address in Brussels, comprising 45% of all organisations with an address in Brussels (Table 3) . The important message from The use of ranges for spending reporting, rather than the need to calculate a precise figure, help to drive up the number of returns from (mostly nonproducer) categories for which disclosure is not compulsory. Almost three quarters (74.2% -968) of all NGOs provided information (rising to 80.5% -277 when restricted to NGOs based in Belgium with a European interest) in the ranges data field. A number which entered no information in the data field stated an exact figure in the accompanying comments field. Producer related interests (Categories I and II) have a choice of spending format (absolute or in ranges), and other categories report in ranges; 82.6% of the former chose to report in ranges, assisting the task of aggregating comparable data. Where we assessed the reporting of absolute figures, we excluded from our analysis a small number of reports of €2 or less from Category II, and less than €100 for Category I.
The most striking picture which emerges from the data is that the differences between Categories I (consultancies) and II (business related and trade union interests), and Category III (NGOs), are not as great as might be expected. For spending in ranges (Table 3) , 67% of Categories I and II; 67%-1823), and 79.1% (765) of NGOs (Category III) report less than €100,000. When comparing Belgian based organisations with a European interest the differences were similar, with 51.2% categories I and II (together), and 63.6%of category III (176) reporting less than €100,000.
TABLE 3 HERE
After discounting unreliable looking cases, we assessed spending reports from ranges as well as absolute figures. There were five entries exceeding €4.25m in Category I (Table 4) , and 13 in Category II (Table 5) . Ten Brussels based EU NGOs organisations reported spending above €800,000, and five over €1m (Table 6) . of the total budget among this population of NGOs which provided budget information (330). 17.5% of companies (53), and 10.7% (84) trade/business/professional associations had received an EU grant in the preceding 12 months, although these mostly relate to participation in the EU's research and technology development programmes, often alongside university partners.
The Transparency Register in comparative perspective
Six EU member states currently have schemes regulating interest representation in some form, nine have measures under consideration, and in a further two countries measures have been either formally considered and rejected (Italy) or adopted and then abandoned (Hungary, 2006 (Hungary, -2011 (Kalnins, 2011) . Longer standing instruments in Germany are more linked to access arrangements and an era where corporatist practices were at their peak (Pross, 2007; JTRS, 2012a (Chari, Hogan and Murphy, 2011; Holman and Luneburg 2012; JTRS, 2012a) .
Debates in European territories have been influenced by the discourse surrounding comparative lobby regulation instruments, in which the TR (and predecessors), as well as longer standing schemes in north America, have featured prominently. Schemes in these latter territories are regarded by a wide range of commentators as those with the highest standards (Pross, 2006; OECD, 2009a Chari, Hogan and Murphy, 2010 Kalnins, 2011; Holman and Luneburg, 2012) . These reports share a counsel against the simple transposition of regulatory devices across territories, and particularly across continents, citing arrangements in some European countries designed to institutionalise business associations and trade unions within corporatist governance arrangements (Pross, 2007; Holman and Luneburg, 2012) . In consequence, OECD's '10 principles for transparency and integrity in lobbying' counsel an appraisal of lessons learned in other systems and the extent to which these can be applied to their own context (OECD, n.d). Instruments aimed at the regulation of lobbyists at EU level first took appraisal of these lessons at an early stage.
Despite differences of context, lobby regulation schemes tend to have a core set of linked drivers (Pross, 2007) . A starting point often involves a case of corruption, sometimes so high profile that it becomes cited in discourse well beyond the territory where the events occurred. Thus, the 'Abramoff scandal' in the United States is widely quoted in justificatory discourse elsewhere;
Kallas explicitly cited the wish to avoid a 'European Abramoff' in his speech announcing the ETI (Kallas, 2005) . Journalists posing as lobbyists tried this out by offering 'cash for amendments' to Members of the European Parliament in early spring 2011. There were three takers, one of whom was an Austrian MEP (and former domestic Minister) subsequently jailed for the offence. The scandal was a strong factor in changing the EP access element from a twelve month pass under the Accredited Lobbyist scheme, to the current arrangement of twelve months accreditation for a one day access pass issued by a special desk in the EP entrance foyer. The new (2012) scheme in Austria which followed the scandal, as well as one in Slovenia which preceded it by a year, each involve mandatory registration of lobbyists, and used as supporting evidence for the claim of 'Europe's new wave of strong lobbying regulation' (Holman and Luneburg, p.91) . 
Conclusions

